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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Cesar Sepulveda contends that several of his constitutional rights were violated 
in these cases.  In the 2013 case, he contends his right to confront the witnesses 
against him was violated by the use of L.M.’s preliminary hearing testimony due to her 
unavailability at trial because he had not been afforded an adequate opportunity to 
cross-examine her on certain topics, notably her history of drug use, which would show 
her bias or had a motive to lie.  He also contends that his due process right to present a 
defense was violated by the decision to not let him present that evidence about L.M.’s 
credibility on the idea that it was not relevant.  In the 2014 case, he contends his right to 
be free from double jeopardy was violated by the imposition of multiple sentences for 
offenses which are included offenses of one another under Idaho’s pleading theory.   
 The State’s responses to these issues are not meritorious.  Many of its 
arguments are raised under improper standards, misconstrue the arguments raised in 
the Appellant’s Brief, or are inconsistent with Idaho and United States Supreme Court 
precedent.  Therefore, those arguments should be rejected.  Because of the violations 
of Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional rights, this Court should vacate his convictions and 
remand these cases for further proceedings. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Sepulveda’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.1   
                                            
1 In the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Sepulveda indicated that efforts were ongoing to locate 
copies of some missing documents, such as the question sheets sent by the jurors 
during deliberation.  (App. Br., p.6 n.3.)  The response from the district court indicated 
that it did not have those documents.  However, as the jury questions were apparently 
read verbatim into the record and appear in the transcripts in the record, Mr. Sepulveda 
has not pursued the matter further. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional right to confront 
the witnesses against him when it granted the State’s motion to present L.M.’s 
preliminary hearing testimony during trial even though he had not been afforded 
an adequate opportunity to cross-examine L.M. 
 
2. Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda’s right to present a defense by 
not allowing him to present evidence challenging L.M.’s credibility based on its 
erroneous conclusion that the evidence was irrelevant. 
 
3. Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional right to be free 
from double jeopardy under the Idaho Constitution by entering convictions and 
imposing sentences for each charge in the 2014 case when one of those charges 
was alleged as the means by which each of the other two charges was 
committed. 
 
4. Whether the accumulated errors in this case require reversal even if this Court 
determines them to be individually harmless. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
The District Court Violated Mr. Sepulveda’s Constitutional Right To Confront The 
Witnesses Against Him When It Granted The State’s Motion To Present L.M.’s 
Preliminary Hearing Testimony During Trial Even Though He Had Not Been Afforded 
An Adequate Opportunity To Cross-Examine L.M. 
 
 
A. Applicable Standard Of Review  
 
The State asserts this issue should be reviewed for an abuse of the district 
court’s discretion.  (Resp. Br., pp.10-11; see generally Resp. Br., pp.10-21.)  That is not 
the proper standard of review.  Rather, as the Idaho Supreme Court has held:  “A trial 
court has broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence and its 
judgment in the fact finding role will only be disturbed on appeal when there has been a 
clear abuse of discretion.  However, whether evidence is relevant is a question of law 
this Court reviews de novo.”  State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6 (2013) (emphasis from 
original) (internal quotations omitted).  Similarly, constitutional questions are “purely 
questions of law,” and so, they are also reviewed de novo.  Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial 
Council, 136 Idaho 63, 67 (2001); cf. Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532, 534 (2013).    
Mr. Sepulveda has raised a constitutional question on this issue – whether his 
constitutional right to confrontation was violated by the use of L.M.’s preliminary hearing 
testimony (see App. Br., p.9) – and the analysis of that question centers on the 
relevance of the testimony he would have, but was not allowed to, explore during his 
cross-examination of L.M. at that hearing.  Therefore, all the relevant questions are 
questions of law, not fact.  See Joy, 155 Idaho at 6; Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 67.  As a 
result, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that this precise claim – whether the use of 
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a transcript of prior testimony without an adequate opportunity to cross-examination, as 
required by the Constitution – “presents a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review.”  State v. Mantz, 148 Idaho 303, 305 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
State v. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245 (1990)).   
Therefore, the proper standard of review on this claim is de novo review, not 
abuse of discretion.  As such, the State’s arguments under the abuse of discretion 
standard, particularly those which call for deference to the district court’s decisions, 
should be rejected as inapplicable under the proper analysis of the claim on appeal. 
 
B. Mr. Sepulveda Was Not Afforded An Adequate Opportunity To Cross-Examine 
L.M. On A Legitimate Source Of Bias Or Motive To Lie During The Preliminary 
Hearing 
  
The State’s primary argument on this issue is that the cases upon which 
Mr. Sepulveda relied do not support his contention that he was denied an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine L.M. on a source of bias or motive to lie.  (Resp. 
Br., pp.15-19.)  The State’s argument is mistaken because Idaho Supreme Court 
precedent is, in fact, clear that it was error to deny Mr. Sepulveda the opportunity to 
cross-examine L.M. along those particular lines.  The cases to which the State refers 
define the scope of the right, and so, are relevant to understanding Mr. Sepulveda’s 
argument.  However, as he pointed out in his initial brief, those cases are factually 
distinguishable from his case.  Therefore, the State’s contention that those cases do not 
“support” Mr. Sepulveda’s argument are without merit. 
First, though, the State’s argument is mistaken because the Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that a witness’s history with drugs is a relevant line of inquiry on cross-
examination as it reveals a source of potential bias and motive to lie.  State v. Gomez, 
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137 Idaho 671, 674-75 (2002).  “The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at 
trial, and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his 
testimony.”  State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 713 (1976) (internal quotation omitted).  Thus, 
in Gomez, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that police had found marijuana 
in the home of two of the witnesses who testified against him.  Id. at 674.  The State 
objected on the basis of relevance, and the district court sustained that objection.  Id. at 
674-75.   
The Supreme Court reversed that decision, explaining, “[t]he questions regarding 
the presence of marijuana were relevant, even though [one of the witnesses] denied 
any agreement to testify in exchange for non-prosecution.”  Id. at 675.  That evidence 
would tend to show those witnesses “had strong motivations to testify for the State.  
They were growing marijuana in a residence with children.  This could have resulted in 
a felony prosecution.  They were not prosecuted.  The jury could have concluded that 
they testified for the State to avoid prosecution, and this could have influence the 
evaluation of their credibility.”  Id.  Thus, the Court concluded, “[t]his type of cross-
examination that is routinely allowed to determine whether witnesses have a motive to 
testify that may bring their credibility into question.  Cross-examination should have 
been allowed.”  Id.   
The evidence Mr. Sepulveda sought to impeach L.M.’s credibility with was similar 
to the evidence the defendant in Gomez sought to introduce.  He wanted to question 
L.M. about her having methamphetamine in the family home.  (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, 
p.26, L.20 - p.27, L.9 (officer’s testimony about Mr. Sepulveda’s version of events); 
Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.7-16 (attempt to cross-examine L.M. on this topic).)  L.M.’s 
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possession of methamphetamine could have resulted in a felony prosecution.  See, 
e.g., I.C. § 37-2732(c).  However, she was not arrested.  (See Tr., Vol.4, p.212, Ls.4-8 
(officer’s testimony that was initially going to arrest L.M., but did not once L.M. made 
accusations against Mr. Sepulveda.)2  Nor does it appear L.M. was ever prosecuted on 
that basis.  (See generally R., Tr.; see also Online Repository.)  Thus, for the same 
reasons discussed in Gomez, the information Mr. Sepulveda sought to explore on 
cross-examination was relevant to L.M.’s credibility.  Compare Gomez, 137 Idaho at 
674-75.  Therefore, as in Gomez, he should have been allowed to cross-examine L.M. 
on those topics.   
The decisions in State v. Richardson and State v. Mantz articulate the scope of 
that rule.  See State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524 (2014); Mantz, 148 Idaho 303.  The 
State fails to appreciate this aspect of those decisions, and so, argues they do not 
support Mr. Sepulveda’s claim for relief because they call for a case-by-case evaluation 
of the associate right to confrontation.  (Resp. Br., p.18.)  While it is true that those 
cases call for a case-by-case analysis, Mr. Sepulveda contended they were 
distinguishable on the facts of his case (i.e., employed a case-by-case analysis) 
because, unlike in Richardson and Mantz, Mr. Sepulveda was not afforded any 
opportunity to cross-examine L.M. on the relevant topic.  Thus, the State’s argument is 
irrelevant to the actual issue raised on appeal. 
                                            
2 In fact, the record reveals the State initially sought to prosecute Mr. Sepulveda for the 
possession of methamphetamine, rather than L.M.  (R., pp.56-57.)  The possession 
charge against Mr. Sepulveda was subsequently dropped by the State.  (See 
R., pp.166-67.) 
 
 8 
Properly understanding Richardson and Mantz, it becomes clear that, evaluating 
the facts of this case, Mr. Sepulveda was denied his confrontation right.  For example, 
the Supreme Court explained in Richardson that the defendant had been allowed to 
question the witness about “his prior felony conviction [and] his drug addiction” during 
the previous hearing.  Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529.  As such, that defendant had been 
afforded an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness about that potential 
source of bias, and thus, that testimony was properly used during the ensuing jury trial.  
Id.  The Court specifically noted that, while it may not have been the best opportunity, in 
that the defendant might have wanted to be more aggressive in his questioning, he had 
still been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witness on those topics, and 
that was the reason there was no constitutional issue with presenting the prior testimony 
at the subsequent trial.  Id.  The same conclusion is evidenced in Mantz.  Mantz, 148 
Idaho at 310-11. 
However, unlike those cases, Mr. Sepulveda was not allowed to explore that line 
of inquiry at all.  The prosecutor objected to relevance after Mr. Sepulveda’s first 
question to L.M. in regard to her history of drug use.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.7-11.)  The 
district court sustained that objection without caveat.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, L.16.)  Therefore, 
Mr. Sepulveda was afforded no opportunity to cross-examine L.M. on those topics, and 
so, he was not allowed to establish the witness’s source of bias or motive to lie.  That is 
a significant, constitutionally infirm limitation on the scope and nature of his cross-
examination of L.M.  See e.g., Gomez, 137 Idaho at 674-75; White, 97 Idaho at 713.  As 
a result, the district court’s decision to allow L.M.’s preliminary hearing testimony to be 
presented at the jury trial violated Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional rights.   
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C. Defense Counsel Made A Sufficient Offer Of Proof On The New, Significant, And 
Material Information He Expected That An Adequate Opportunity To Cross-
Examine L.M. Would Have Yielded 
 
The State contends that trial counsel’s offer of proof as to what he expected the 
cross-examination of L.M. to have revealed was insufficient to make out the 
constitutional claim because trial counsel’s second alleged problem with the opportunity 
to cross-examine L.M. – that the defense team did not have L.M.’s medical records at 
the preliminary hearing, and so, could not adequately question her – was disproved by 
the record.  (See Resp. Br., p.20 (citing, among others, Tr., Vol.3, p.27, Ls.16-21).)  To 
be clear, as the prosecutor revealed, the medical records in question were L.M.’s 
psychiatric records.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.32, Ls.13-17.)  While the district court made no finding 
of fact as to whether the defense team actually had those records prior to the 
preliminary hearing (see generally R., Tr.), the record does show that, prior to the 
preliminary hearing, the magistrate had found L.M.’s medical records relevant and 
ordered they could be discovered to defense counsel.  (R., pp.20-22.)  Nevertheless, 
the State’s argument is mistaken for two reasons.   
First, trial counsel did not invoke the absence of the medical records in regard to 
his contention that the opportunity to cross-examine L.M. on her drug use was 
inadequate.  Rather, he only discussed the absence of the medical records in regard to 
his contention that the opportunity to cross-examine L.M. on her mental health issues 
was inadequate.   
Trial counsel’s whole argument regarding the opportunity to cross-examine was 
as follows: 
I think it’s on page 16 [of the preliminary hearing transcript]. 
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[Preliminary hearing counsel] had asked: “Have you ever harmed 
yourself?” 
There was an objection to relevance.  [Preliminary hearing counsel] 
proffered that it was relevant, that she may lay more foundation.  
I think although she went forward with a line of questioning, it didn’t 
fully develop the concept of whether [L.M.] had harmed herself. 
Our belief is that there was a mental health condition, that one of 
the symptoms of that mental health condition is self-mutilation or inflicting 
harm to one’s self as part of the diagnosis that became light or became 
more clear once we received some medical records.   
We didn’t have the ability at the time to lay a sufficient foundation to 
develop that line of questioning, and in addition to that, we were 
somewhat shut down by the state’s objection and the court upholding that 
or sustaining that objection.  
There was another time when the state also objected to the line of 
questioning which prevented an adequate opportunity for us or an 
adequate cross examination of [L.M.].  So I believe, I mean, our stance is 
that numbers two and three of the analysis have not been satisfied. 
It’s more than just saying we had an opportunity to cross examine, 
but it’s more of an adequate opportunity to cross examine. 
We didn’t have -- we did not have the medical records.  We didn’t 
have a full understanding, or that she may even had [sic] a mental health 
condition.  She denied that, and in some of the questions of seeing a 
medical doctor or any other type of doctors or any other types of 
counselors. 
She also denied any use of methamphetamine or any other types 
of illegal substances.  And there was an objection to that when asked if 
she had been using earlier in the week.  So we weren’t able to explore 
that further and perhaps develop more of a credibility issue. 
And because of those things, Your Honor, I don’t think the state has 
satisfied that the analysis is complete and that this preliminary hearing 
transcript should be admitted. 
 
(Tr., Vol.3, p.28, L.5 - p.30, L.2; compare Tr., Vol.1, p.16, L.16 - p.17, L.1 (the portion of 
the preliminary hearing to which trial counsel was referring.)   
As trial counsel’s comments demonstrate, he referred to the medical records in 
articulating why the defense team’s ability to cross-examine L.M. on her mental health 
issues was not adequate.  For example, L.M.’s history of self-harm, which was part of 
Mr. Sepulveda’s version of events (that L.M. had inflicted the injuries the officers saw on 
herself (see, e.g., Tr., Vol.4, p.350, Ls.21-23)), “became more clear once we received 
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the medical records.”  (Tr., Vol.3, p.28, Ls.14-19.)  Similarly, “we did not have the 
medical records.  We didn’t have a full understanding, or that she may even had [sic] a 
mental health condition,” and so, could not adequately cross-examine on that topic.  
(Tr., Vol.3, p.29, L.11-17.)  That trial counsel was invoking the medical records only as 
to the ability to cross-examine on L.M.’s mental health issues is consistent with the 
prosecutor’s clarification that the records being referred to were L.M.’s “psychiatric 
notes from her psychologist, not the actual medical records from [L.M.’s] two talks with 
the paramedics, her visit to Saint Alphonsus.”  (Tr., Vol.3, p.32, Ls.13-17.)  Thus, the 
absence of the medical records was not in regard to the opportunity to cross-examine 
L.M. on her drug use.  Because the ability to cross-examine L.M. on her drug use is the 
only of these two issues challenged on appeal (see generally App. Br.), the State’s 
reliance on the fact that the defense team had the psychiatric records is irrelevant.  
Therefore, this Court should not give weight to that argument.  
Second, even if the medical records were invoked in regard to the opportunity to 
cross examine L.M. about her drug use, trial counsel articulated a second, separate 
basis for the constitutional challenge which sufficiently identified information he 
anticipated an adequate cross-examination would have revealed.  Specifically, trial 
counsel argued that “[L.M.] also denied any use of methamphetamine or any other 
types of illegal substances.  And there was an objection to that when asked if she had 
been using earlier in the week.  So we weren’t able to explore that further and perhaps 
develop more of a credibility issue there.”  (Tr., Vol.3, p.29, Ls.18-23.)  Trial counsel 
also explained that, had cross-examination on that topic been allowed, the defense 
team would have been able to impeach her testimony on direct examination, that “[s]he 
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also denied any use of methamphetamines or any other types of illegal substances.” 
(Tr., Vol.3, p.29, Ls.18-20).  That impeaching information is significant, material 
information that was not included in the testimony read to the jury.  Compare, e.g., 
Gomez, 137 Idaho at 675 (holding that cross-examination into precisely those sort of 
questions should have been allowed).  Therefore, the State’s medical-records argument 
is further revealed to be misplaced.  Even without that justification, trial counsel still 
made a sufficient argument to establish the violation of Mr. Sepulveda’s confrontation 
right. 
Finally, the State asserts that, because Mr. Sepulveda was able to present some 
evidence of L.M.’s drug use at the trial, the use of the transcript of L.M.’s preliminary 
hearing testimony was not problematic.  (Resp. Br., pp.20-21.)  The State’s argument in 
that regard is contrary to Idaho Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court 
precedent.   
In a similar case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, even though counsel had 
referred to a particular line of evidence at the trial, he had still been denied his right to 
cross-examine a particular witness in regard to that line of evidence.  White, 97 Idaho at 
713 n.6.  Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded, the subsequent presentation of 
evidence did not cure the violation of his right to confrontation.  Id. 
In reaching that conclusion, the Idaho Supreme Court cited the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974).  There, the 
Supreme Court held that errors such as this, where the defendant is denied his right to 
confrontation, are “constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing 
of want of prejudice would cure it.”  Id. (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added).  
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However, the United States Supreme Court subsequently explained that this is not a per 
se rule mandating reversal.  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 683 (1986).  
Nevertheless, it reaffirmed that, where the district court completely shuts off the 
opportunity to cross-examine a potential source of bias, that is a constitutional violation:   
the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that [the witness] 
would be biased as a result of the State’s dismissal of his pending public 
drunkenness charge.  By thus cutting off all questioning about an event 
that the State consented had taken place and that a jury might reasonably 
have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in 
his testimony, the court’s ruling violated respondent’s rights secured by 
the Confrontation Clause. 
 
Id. at 678.  Thus, it held:  “Respondent, like Harrington,[3] was denied an opportunity to 
cast doubt on the testimony of an adverse witness.  In both cases the prosecution was 
thus able to introduce evidence that was not subject to constitutionally adequate cross-
examination.”  Id. at 683 (leaving the question of harmlessness to the state courts, as it 
had not reached that issue originally).  Therefore, the State’s argument based on the 
evidence Mr. Sepulveda was able to present on that point at trial is erroneous and 
should be rejected. 
 And while the United States Supreme Court left open the possibility that errors in 
this regard might be harmless, see id., the State has not argued that this error in this 
regard is harmlessness.  (See generally Resp. Br., pp.10-21 (the State’s entire 
argument as to the Confrontation Clause); compare, e.g., Resp. Br., p.26 (expressly 
arguing harmless error on Issue II, regarding whether Mr. Sepulveda’s due process right 
to present a defense was violated by determining his cross-examination into L.M.’s 
potential sources of bias was irrelevant).)  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, 
                                            
3 See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). 
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when the State does not specifically argue harmless error on an issue, it fails to meet its 
burden to prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:  “the State never 
specifically argues that Hust’s identification did not ‘contribute to the verdict obtained’ as 
clearly required under Perry.  For example, the subject is not even discussed in the 
State’s written brief on appeal . . . . Therefore, this Court finds that the State failed to 
meet its burden of proving that the error is harmless.”  State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 
598-99 (2013).  Since the State, as it did in Almaraz, has not specifically argued 
harmlessness on this particular issue, it has failed to meet its burden in that regard on 
this issue.   
Even if this Court were to consider a harmless error argument, however, for the 
same reasons explained by the United States Supreme Court in Van Arsdell, the State 
has failed to carry its burden of showing this error was harmless.  See Van Arsdall, 475 
U.S. at 683.  The State was able to admit L.M’s testimony without L.M. having been 
subjected to cross-examination on topics showing her bias or motive to lie.  Because 
this case turned on the jury’s credibility determination, there is a reasonable possibility 
that L.M.’s erroneously-admitted testimony contributed to the verdict rendered in this 
case, which means the error was not harmless.  See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 279 (1993) (articulating the proper analysis under the harmless error test).   
Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Sepulveda’s conviction in this case 
because it was based on the erroneous admission of L.M.’s preliminary hearing 
testimony in violation of his constitutional right to confrontation. 
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II. 
The District Court Violated Mr. Sepulveda’s Right To Present A Defense By Not 
Allowing Him To Present Evidence Challenging L.M.’s Credibility Based On Its 
Erroneous Conclusion That The Evidence Was Irrelevant 
 
 
A. Applicable Standard Of Review 
 
As with is argument on the Confrontation Clause issue, the State contends this 
issue should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  (Resp. Br., p.22.)  Again, the State 
misunderstands the argument raised, and so, is arguing under the wrong standard of 
review.  This issue presents more than just an evidentiary ruling on the relevance of an 
objection; it contends that Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional right to due process4 was 
violated because the ruling prevented him from presenting his defense to the jury.  
(App. Br., pp.20-21.)  Idaho’s courts have recognized that this is a valid constitutional 
claim.  State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239 (2009); State v. Karpach, 146 Idaho 736, 
739-41 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Constitutional questions are “purely questions of law,” and so, they are also 
reviewed de novo.  Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 67; cf. Fields, 155 Idaho at 534.  Since this 
issue presents constitutional challenge, the proper standard of appellate review is de 
novo.  Therefore, this Court should reject the State’s arguments under the wrong 
standard, particularly those which call for deference to the district court’s decisions. 
 
B. This Issue Is Properly Challenged As Preserved Error 
 
While the error in this regard was initially the product of the magistrate’s ruling at 
the preliminary hearing, the facts of this case, particularly the fact that L.M.’s preliminary 
                                            
4 U.S. Const. amend XIV. 
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hearing testimony was substituted for live testimony at trial due to her unavailability, 
demonstrate that the same objection was, of necessity, made and ruled on during L.M.’s 
“trial testimony.”  Therefore, Mr. Sepulveda claims that he should be allowed to 
challenge that ruling as preserved error. 
The State’s primary argument for why the issue should be seen as unpreserved 
is based on the idea that Mr. Sepulveda did not specifically ask the district court to 
make evidentiary rulings in regard to L.M.’s testimony.  (Resp. Br., p.23.)  First, that 
argument ignores the facts of this case, as the parties did ask the district court to rule on 
the admissibility of L.M.’s preliminary hearing testimony.  (See Tr., Vol.3, p.26, L.13 - 
p.34, L.3.)  The district court rejected Mr. Sepulveda’s arguments as to why that 
testimony should not be admitted and ordered that L.M.’s entire preliminary hearing 
testimony was admissible.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.34, L.4 - p.37, L.10; Tr., Vol.3, p.38, L.23 - 
p.40, L.2.)  Therefore, there was a specific request for an evidentiary ruling in regard to 
L.M.’s testimony; the district court determined it was all admissible.  As such, errors in 
that determination, including the erroneous limitation on cross-examination are properly 
reviewed on appeal. 
Second, the effect of the State’s argument would be that trial counsel had to 
request the district court effectively reverse the magistrate’s determination of irrelevancy 
and allow further cross-examination into L.M.’s sources of bias.  Such a motion, based 
on the facts of this case, would only serve to waste judicial resources because that relief 
was not available – L.M. was deceased and not able to answer relevant additional 
questions.   
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This, then, is more like the situation the Idaho Supreme Court addressed in 
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999).  In that case, which dealt with the propriety 
of the jury instructions, the defendant did not raise an objection to the jury instructions 
when it appeared that the district court had already made a final ruling on the matter.  
Id.  The Idaho Supreme Court held that the defendant did not need to raise an objection 
in that situation for the issue to be properly considered on appeal.  Id.  As the Supreme 
Court later explained, when a matter had been discussed and the court had reached a 
decision, meaning an objection would not serve a practical purpose, the decision could 
be properly reviewed on appeal.  State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 448-49 (2012).  As 
in those cases, the request the State insists should have been made here would serve 
no practical purpose.  Therefore, the lack of such an objection should not bar appellate 
review of that issue. 
Finally, the nature of the presentation of L.M.’s testimony to the jury dictates that 
the objection and ruling thereon were made at the trial level.  The point of playing the 
preliminary hearing testimony was to make it as though L.M. was giving that same 
testimony in the trial itself.  The record bears that conclusion out.  A recording of L.M.’s 
preliminary hearing testimony was played without modification for the jury.  The jury was 
instructed to consider L.M.’s evidence alongside the trial testimony of the other 
witnesses.  (See, e.g., R., p.200 (instructing the jury to consider all the evidence 
including the sworn testimony of witnesses and exhibits admitted into evidence); 
R., p.190 (instructing the jury that they were to evaluate all the evidence in their 
determination of the facts).)   
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That means, as a matter of practical effect, during the trial, L.M. was asked on 
cross-examination if she had used methamphetamine in the days preceding the event.  
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.7-9.)  The prosecutor objected to that question on relevance 
grounds.  (See Tr., Vol.1, p.17, L.11.)  As with any other objection to the admissibility of 
such evidence, the trial court had to rule on that objection.  The ruling on the record is 
that the prosecutor’s relevancy objection was sustained.  (See Tr., Vol.1, p.17, L.16.)  
Since the district court did not articulate any contrary ruling, it must have, by necessity 
of the particular facts of this case, also sustained the prosecutor’s relevancy objection.  
No other interpretation of the presentation of that evidence makes sense, nor does the 
State proffer any alternative view of that evidence.  (See generally Resp. Br.) 
That conclusion is consistent with the rules about law of the case for a similar 
situation where one judge succeeds another in presiding over a case.  Unless the 
successor judge is going to reverse a prior decision, the initial decision will be 
considered as still controlling on the issue.  Thus, it will continue to govern the same 
issues in subsequent stages of that case.  Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating 
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1988).  Under those circumstances, that ruling can be 
challenged on appeal.  Here, that means the decision that the cross-examination into 
L.M.’s drug history was not relevant is the valid ruling governing the scope of 
Mr. Sepulveda’s cross-examination of L.M.  The State offers no argument against that 
analysis.  (See generally Resp. Br.)  Therefore, it was a preserved issue because the 
trial court necessarily had to rule on it.  See, e.g., State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 
(1998).  As such, it is properly raised in this appeal and this Court should consider the 
merits of that argument. 
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However, even if the State is correct, this Court should still consider this claim 
under the fundamental error framework.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) 
(setting forth the fundamental error framework).  The error affects Mr. Sepulveda’s 
unwaived constitutional right to due process by preventing him from presenting his 
defense.   Meister, 148 Idaho at 239 (“The right to present a defense includes the right 
to offer testimony of witnesses, compel their attendance, and to present the defendant’s 
version of facts to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.”) (internal quotation 
omitted); Karpach, 146 Idaho at 739-41 (finding a denial of this right when the defendant 
was not allowed to present relevant evidence which would contradict the testimony of 
one of the State’s witnesses).  The relevant facts are clear from the face of the record.  
(Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.7-16.)  And, for the same reasons discussed in detail in Section 
II(D), infra, there is a reasonable possibility that this error contributed to the verdict 
rendered since this case turned on the jury’s credibility determinations. As such, it was 
prejudicial. 
 
C. Since Cross-Examination Into L.M.’s Potential Sources Of Bias Or Motive To Lie 
Was Relevant, The Exclusion Of That Evidence Violated Mr. Sepulveda’s Right 
To Present His Defense 
 
On the merits of this issue, Mr. Sepulveda contends that, by determining his 
attempt to cross-examine L.M. on a potential sources of bias was irrelevant, the courts 
denied him his due process right to present a defense.  The State, however, would 
break this issue into two distinct claims – a challenge to the determination that cross-
examining L.M. on her history of drug use was irrelevant and a challenge to the 
determination that the nature of L.M.’s death was irrelevant.  (See Resp. Br., pp.22-26.)  
That is a superficial distinction at best.   
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Both challenges are based on the fact that Mr. Sepulveda was trying to impeach 
L.M.’s direct testimony wherein she denied any use of methamphetamine.  As trial 
counsel explained, “[s]he also denied any use of methamphetamine or any other type of 
illegal substances . . . we weren’t able to explore that further and perhaps develop more 
of a credibility issue.”   (Tr., Vol.3, p.29, Ls.18-23.)  Similarly, as to the nature of her 
passing, “it does relate to this case, where she has continued to struggle with drug 
abuse, and that goes to the weight of her testimony.”  (Tr., Vol.4, p.13, L.20)  Therefore, 
the two points are not distinct from one another, and the State’s attempt to so separate 
them is mistaken.  Basically, this comes down to the fact that, if Mr. Sepulveda is 
correct in either respect, his right to present his defense was denied because he was 
not allowed to present his version of the facts to the jury.  See Meister, 148 Idaho at 
239; Karpach, 146 Idaho at 739-41.  
Furthermore, the merits of this issue are essentially settled by application of 
Idaho Supreme Court precedent.  As discussed in Section I, supra, the Supreme Court 
held in Gomez that cross-examination into the witness’s drug use was relevant because 
it exposed bias and a motive to lie derived from the witness’s desire to avoid 
prosecution for that drug use.  Gomez, 137 Idaho at 674-75; cf. White, 97 Idaho at 713 
(explaining that cross-examination into a witness’s potential biases and motives to lie is 
“always relevant”).  Therefore, cross-examination into those relevant issues “should 
have been allowed.”  Gomez, 137 Idaho at 675.  The decision which foreclosed 
Mr. Sepulveda from engaging in precisely that type of cross-examination was similarly 
erroneous, as it denied him the ability to present evidence (witness testimony) that 
would contradict the testimony elicited from L.M. on direct examination.   
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That same analysis is applicable to the nature of L.M.’s passing – it impacts the 
credibility of her testimony that she had not used methamphetamine.  (See Tr., Vol.1, 
p.16, Ls.3-4.)  This is not, as the State believes, an assertion that “because L.M. had 
methamphetamine in her system when she committed suicide, it shows she was 
struggling with methamphetamine use on the day in question.”  (Resp. Br., p.25.)  That 
would be an improper logical connection to draw, and so, Mr. Sepulveda did not draw it.  
(See generally App. Br.)  Rather, Mr. Sepulveda argued below and continues to argue 
on appeal that it is evidence relevant to the credibility of L.M.’s testimony on direct 
examination:  “it does relate to this case, where she has continued to struggle with drug 
abuse, and that goes to the weight of her testimony.”  (Tr., Vol.4, p.13, L.20; cf. App. 
Br., p.20 (pointing out that the State was allowed to refer to events following the incident 
in question to try and bolster L.M.’s credibility, and so, her continuing methamphetamine 
use and its impact on her behavior was also relevant to her credibility).)  Therefore, 
evidence that she continued to use methamphetamine, shown by the overdose, tends to 
show her bias, her motive to give untrue testimony, and so, it is relevant.  I.R.E. 401; 
see White, 97 Idaho at 713.  “Evidence that goes to the credibility of the complaining 
witness is normally admitted under a broad standard.”  Joy, 155 Idaho 13.  Therefore, 
Mr. Sepulveda should have been allowed to present that evidence.   
Finally, the fact that L.M. continued to use methamphetamine remains relevant to 
her credibility regardless of the fact that L.M. may have used that methamphetamine 
along with other prescribed medication.  (See Resp. Br., pp.24-25 (arguing that the 
presence of the prescribed mediation renders this evidence irrelevant).)  The State’s 
arguments to the contrary speak to the weight of that evidence, not its admissibility.  
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Compare State v. Lopez-Orozco, 159 Idaho 375, 386 (2015) (examining a witness’s 
prior inconsistent statements under hearsay rules, and explaining that “[w]hile it 
certainly goes to the weight of this evidence, it does not impact [the] admissibility” of 
that witness’s subsequent statements).  Such questions about the weight of admissible 
evidence are appropriately left to the jury to determine.  See, e.g., McKim v. Horner, 143 
Idaho 568, 572-73 (2006) (“Weighing the evidence, including the credibility of 
witnesses, is within the province of the trier of fact—the jury.”); State v. Bolton, 119 
Idaho 846, 850 (Ct. App. 1991) (same).  Therefore the district court’s determination – 
that Mr. Sepulveda would not be allowed to present evidence about L.M.’s drug use for 
the reason that it was not relevant – is erroneous and should be vacated.  
 
D. The State Has Applied The Wrong Standard In Its Assertion That This Error Was 
Harmless 
 
The State contends this error was harmless in light of the other evidence it 
presented.  (Resp. Br., p.26.)  That argument applies the wrong standard, as it 
effectively asks this Court to sit as a thirteenth juror and conclude that, absent those 
errors, the verdict would be the same.   
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that, when errors are objected-to 
below, Idaho’s courts apply the harmless error test articulated in Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18 (1967).  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).  Under Chapman, the 
Idaho Supreme Court explained, “a reversal is necessitated, unless the State proves 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.’”  Id. (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24) (emphasis from Perry).   
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The United States Supreme Court has also clarified precisely what that analysis 
requires the appellate courts to decide.  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).  
“Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee,[5] the question [Chapman] instructs the 
reviewing court to consider is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be 
expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty 
verdict in the case at hand.”  Id.  Therefore, “[h]armless-error review looks, we have 
said, to the basis on which ‘the jury actually rested its verdict.’”  Id. (quoting Yates v. 
Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991) (emphasis from Sullivan)).   
As such, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument the 
State now advances here:  “The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that 
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered.”  Id.  “That 
must be so,” the Supreme Court explained, “because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that 
was never in fact rendered—no matter how inescapable the findings to support that 
verdict might be—would violate the jury trial guarantee.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Therefore, this Court should refuse to, as the State encourages it to do, consider 
whether, in a trial without the error, the same verdict would have been rendered.  No 
matter how inescapable the conclusions the State advances might be, adopting its 
argument would create an independent violation of Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional right 
to a jury trial. 
Instead, this Court should apply the proper, constitutional analysis, which, 
according to the United States Supreme Court, is to determine “whether the guilty 
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to these error.  Id.  The 
                                            
5 U.S. Const. amend V. 
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State has failed to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the errors did not contribute 
to the verdict rendered in this case.   
This case turned on a credibility determination between Mr. Sepulveda’s version 
of events and the State’s version of events.  (See generally Tr., Vol.4.)  Mr. Sepulveda’s 
version of events was that L.M. attacked him when he confronted her about her stash of 
methamphetamine.  (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.4, p.343, L.18 - p.354, L.7 (Mr. Sepulveda’s 
account on direct examination at trial).)  The State’s version of events, based on L.M.’s 
testimony and the neighbor’s testimony, was that Mr. Sepulveda was the primary 
aggressor.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, L.1 - p.13, L.20 (L.M.’s account on direct examination at 
the preliminary hearing); Tr., Vol.4, p.149, L.1 - p.152, L.25 (the neighbor’s account on 
direct examination at trial).)  As such, the question came down to which of those 
versions of events the jury believed. 
During deliberations, the jury sent a question which provides insight on that point, 
as the jurors asked whether a person acting in self-defense could be guilty of attempted 
strangulation.  (Tr., Vol.4, p.483, Ls.9-12.)  That question indicates that at least one 
juror had doubts about the credibility of the State’s version of events.  Compare State v. 
Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, 919-20 (2015) (holding that, in a case where a jury question 
revealed that at least one juror had concerns about the credibility of the State’s version 
of events, the State had failed to show that the errors in that case were harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.)  Therefore, as in Thomas, this Court should conclude that 
the State has failed to meet its burden under the proper standard for harmless error.   
Furthermore, the jury’s question reveals that, contrary to the State’s assertion, 
the evidence in this case was not as strong as the State believes, regardless of the 
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neighbor’s testimony and the recording of her 911 call.  The jury determined that to be 
an inaccurate account, i.e., that it did not support the idea Mr. Sepulveda was the 
primary aggressor and had attempted to strangle L.M.  In fact, the jury ultimately 
acquitted Mr. Sepulveda of attempted strangulation.  (R., p.404.)  Thus, the State’s 
argument on harmlessness based on the purported strength of the evidence is 
disproved by the jury verdict.  Therefore, it should be rejected as contrary to the facts in 
the record.  Either way, the State has failed to carry its burden of proving this error 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
III. 
The District Court Violated Mr. Sepulveda’s Constitutional Right To Be Free From 
Double Jeopardy Under The Idaho Constitution By Entering Convictions And Imposing 
Sentences For Each Charge In The 2014 Case When One Of Those Charges Was 
Alleged As The Means By Which Each Of The Other Two Charges Was Committed 
 
 
A. As Charged, The Intimidating Charge And The Violation Of No Contact Order 
Charges Are Based On The Same Factual Circumstances, And So, Are Included 
Offenses 
 
In responding to Mr. Sepulveda’s double jeopardy claim, the State raises an idea 
in a footnote which is, in actuality, critical to understanding the proper analysis for this 
issue.  The State remarks that “[Mr.] Sepulveda argues that felony intimidation of a 
witness is somehow a lesser included offense of misdemeanor attempted violation of a 
no-contact order.”  (Resp. Br., p.31 n.7.)  The State’s focus on the designation of felony 
and misdemeanor is misplaced and demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the doctrine surrounding included offenses and double jeopardy.   
The concept of “lesser” and “greater” in terms of “included offenses” represents 
an attempt to define the scope of the competing charges – which offense encompasses 
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which.  That determination has nothing to do with the potential penalties associated with 
the competing charges.  Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, there is no 
problem with inattentive driving subjecting a person to an arguably greater penalty than 
reckless driving despite the statutory designation that inattentive driving is a “lesser 
included offense” of reckless driving.  State v. Parker, 141 Idaho 775, 779 (2005).  
Therefore, the terms “greater” and “lesser” as they refer to included offenses are 
somewhat misleading, as demonstrated by the State’s remark in footnote 7.  See, e.g., 
State v. Gilman, 105 Idaho 891, 896 (Ct. App. 1983) (“Special care must be taken when 
instructing a jury about an offense which is ‘included’ in the crime charged but which 
actually carries an equal or greater potential penalty.  Use of the term ‘lesser’ to 
describe such an offense may be misleading.”).   
Rather, the fundamental rule is that “[w]hatever the sequence may be, the Fifth 
Amendment forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater 
and lesser included offense.”  Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977).  As such, if a 
felony is alleged as the means by which a misdemeanor is committed, the felony is still 
the “included” offense since, under the Idaho Constitution, an “included offense” is 
simply “one which is necessarily committed in the commission of another offense; or 
one, the essential elements of which are charged in the information as the manner or 
means by which the offense was committed.”  State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 434 
(1980).   
The language in the charging document in this case reveals that Mr. Sepulveda 
was convicted and sentenced for multiple counts which constitute included offenses 
under Idaho’s pleading theory, and thus, reveal a double jeopardy violation under the 
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Idaho Constitution.  Specifically, the means by which Mr. Sepulveda is alleged to have 
attempted to violate the no-contact orders is the same as the means by which he is 
alleged to have intimidated a witness – contacting other persons to ask them to relay 
messages to subject of the no-contact order.   
The State contends that, because the elements of one charge are not repeated 
in the other charge, there is no double jeopardy violation under the pleading test:   
[Mr.] Sepulveda’s manner of committing intimidating a witness . . . makes 
no reference to the existence of a no contact order.  The means by which 
[Mr.] Sepulveda committed attempted violation of a no contact order . . . 
makes no reference to whether L.M. was a witness or whether 
[Mr.] Sepulveda intended to prevent her from testifying. 
 
(Resp. Br., p.33.)  That argument is flawed on several levels, and so, should be 
rejected.  
First, it improperly subdivides the course of conduct at issue.  As the Idaho Court 
of Appeals has recently explained, subdividing a course of conduct into multiple 
segments, so as to dodge the limits of the constitutional protection against double 
jeopardy, is inappropriate.  State v. Moffat, 154 Idaho 529, 533-34 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown).  The State’s argument in this case 
asks this Court to do precisely that:  look only at the message Mr. Sepulveda allegedly 
wanted conveyed (say certain things at trial), and hold that constitutes the intimidating a 
witness, then look separately at the person to whom Mr. Sepulveda wanted that 
message conveyed (L.M.), and hold that constitutes attempt to violate a no-contact 
order.  (See Resp. Br., p.33.)  That is inappropriate.  Id.; cf. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169 
(“The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can 
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avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of 
temporal or spatial units.”) 
Second, adopting the State’s argument on the application of the pleading test 
would essentially render Idaho’s pleading test to be coextensive with the federal 
elements test, focusing only on whether the elements of the two offenses are the same.  
(See Resp. Br., p.33 (arguing there is no violation because the indicating charge does 
not include the element of a valid no contact order and because the no contact order 
charges do not include the element of a testifying witness).)  However, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has made it clear those two tests are not the same:  “Different 
jurisdictions follow a variety of approaches for defining lesser included offenses.  At one 
extreme, the federal courts apply the ‘strict elements’ approach and look only to the 
statutory elements of the crime charged. . . . The ‘pleading theory,’ which Idaho has 
adopted, is an intermediate approach.”  State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841 (2013).  
Thus, Idaho’s test is broader (i.e., protects in more situations) than its federal 
counterpart. 
Rather, the State’s argument appears to be an attempt to hybridize the elements 
test and Idaho’s pleading test, which would track with the interpretation of Thompson in 
such cases as State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383 (2010), State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742 
(1991), overruled on other grounds, and Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197 (1986) 
(hereinafter, “the Sivak interpretation”).  See State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 375 
(Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the confusion that existed in Idaho law as a result of the 
Sivak interpretation).  However, the Corbus Court also noted that it was not actually 
clear whether, in Sivak for example, the Supreme Court was analyzing the double 
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jeopardy claim under the federal or Idaho constitution.  Id. at 373 n.3.  Regardless, the 
Sivak interpretation provided there would be no double jeopardy violation unless “all the 
elements of [the included offense] are contained within the elements of [the overarching 
offense].”  Id.  Thus, when the Corbus Court tried to apply the pleading test, it found 
that, if Thompson were purely applied to the facts in that case, there would be a double 
jeopardy violation, but if the Sivak interpretation were given effect, there would not be 
double jeopardy violation under those same facts.  Id. 
However, in more recent decisions, the Idaho Supreme Court has been clearer 
as to the proper application of Idaho’s pleading test.  See, e.g., McKinney, 153 Idaho 
837; State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525 (2011).  As the Court of Appeals thereafter 
explained, those recent decisions have resolved the confusion caused by the Sivak 
interpretation as the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed that Thompson itself is the proper 
standard.  See, e.g., State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 n.3 (Ct. App. 2014).  Thus, by 
employing a pure application of Thompson, the Idaho Supreme Court implicitly rejected 
the Sivak interpretation.   
For example, in Flegel, the Idaho Supreme Court explained the elements-based 
analysis is the proper analysis under the federal Constitution.  Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527.  
However, when it turned to the Idaho Constitution, the Supreme Court clarified that the 
pleading theory “holds that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in the 
information [or indictment] as a means or element of the commission of the higher 
offense.”  Id.; cf. McKinney 153 Idaho at 841.  The important result is that “the Idaho 
Supreme Court again applied the Thompson pleading test to a double jeopardy claim 
arising under the Idaho Constitution, without mentioning the statutory elements test.”  
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Moad, 156 Idaho at 658 n.3 (emphasis added).  Therefore, the State’s argument, which 
would employ an elements-based analysis as part of Idaho’s pleading test, is 
erroneous. 
The State’s argument in that regard is not saved by the Idaho Supreme Court’s 
decision in State v. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho 647 (2014).  (See Resp. Br., pp.32-33.)  
In that case, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he Defendant also asserts that the 
conspiracy and the trafficking charges were the same offense under the pleading 
theory, although he does not present any argument supporting that assertion . . . ,” 
apart from, the Court surmised, the fact they were both based on his possession of 400 
grams or more of methamphetamine.  Id.  Because the argument under the Idaho 
pleading test was not clear, the Court’s discussion of that topic appears to be dicta. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s discussion of the Idaho pleading test reveals 
the State’s reliance thereon to be misplaced.  The Supreme Court explained that the 
perceived argument in that case would be based on a misreading of the charging 
documents, which alleged two separate offenses:  a conspiracy to possess 
methamphetamine and actually possessing methamphetamine (charged as “trafficking” 
because of the amount of methamphetamine allegedly possessed).  Id.  Actually 
possessing the methamphetamine, while ostensibly the goal of the conspiracy, was not 
the means by which the conspiracy – the agreement to engage in the criminal 
enterprise combined with the intent to actually follow through on the agreement, see, 
e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 137 – was committed.  See Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho 
at 649.  Nor was making agreements to engage in an enterprise to possess 
methamphetamine the means by which the defendant actually came into possession of 
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the methamphetamine.  See id.  Rather, the Supreme Court explained, the mention of 
the 400 grams in the conspiracy charge was simply to identify the object of the 
conspiracy.  Id.  As a result, the trafficking charge and the conspiracy charge were not 
included offenses under the pleading theory.  Id.   
The State overstates the scope of that discussion by contenting Sanchez-Castro 
stands for the idea “that simply because two counts refer to the same actions, those two 
counts [do not] necessarily violate double jeopardy (Resp. Br., p.32 (emphasis added).)  
That reading is mistaken because the Supreme Court determined that the two charges 
were not referring to the “same actions.”  Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 649.  The 
determination that they were referring to different actions is the premise for its entire 
discussion of the pleading theory.  See id. 
Rather, it is the Court of Appeals’ decision in Corbus which exemplifies how 
Idaho’s pleading test under Thompson operates when the charges do refer to the same 
actions.  In Corbus, the Court explained:  
The language used in both counts lays out the same factual 
circumstances as the basis for each offense.  The means by which Corbus 
eluded the police—driving in excess of 100 mph, passing other vehicles, 
turning off his headlights after sunset, and endangering the person or 
property of another—are the same means by which Corbus drove 
recklessly. 
 
Corbus, 151 Idaho at 375.  Because the charges did, in fact, refer to the same actions, 
the Court of Appeals concluded:  “Under the Thompson formulation and the information 
with which Corbus was charged, therefore, reckless driving is a lesser included offense 
of eluding a police officer and Corbus’s conviction and punishment for both offenses 
was in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho Constitution.”  Id.  
Contrarily, in Sanchez-Castro, where there were two factual circumstances – first, the 
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agreement to join in the unlawful enterprise, followed at some later point, by actually 
coming into possession of the methamphetamine – no double jeopardy violation 
occurred.  See Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 649. 
Mr. Sepulveda’s case is similar to Corbus as the charging document in his case 
alleged the same factual circumstances as the basis for Count I and Count II (asking 
another person, L.M.’s sister, to relay a message to L.M.), and the same factual 
circumstances as the basis for Count I and Count III (asking another person, 
Ms. Cameron, to relay a message to L.M.).  (R., p.278.)  Therefore, contrary to the 
State’s assertion under its erroneously-narrow and already-rejected application of the 
Idaho pleading theory, the dual convictions and punishments in those two respects 
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho Constitution.  That error is plain from 
the face of the record and it obviously prejudiced Mr. Sepulveda.  Therefore, it 
constitutes fundamental error. 
   
B. Remedy 
The State provides no argument against Mr. Sepulveda’s analysis on the proper 
remedy in this case, as it only argues that there was no error.  (See generally Resp. 
Br., pp.27-34; see App. Br., p.27.)  Therefore, this Court should vacate the problematic 
conviction – the intimidating charge, as it was charged as the means by which 
Mr. Sepulveda violated the no-contact order.  See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 436 
(affirming the order dismissing the included charge). 
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IV. 
The Accumulated Errors In This Case Require Reversal Even If This Court Determines 
Them To Be Individually Harmless 
 
The State contends that the cumulative error doctrine should not be applied in 
this case under its belief that Mr. Sepulveda has not shown any errors to accumulate.  
(Resp. Br., p.34.)  As demonstrated supra, the State’s belief is mistaken.  There were 
several violations of Mr. Sepulveda’s rights in this case.   
The State also contends that this Court should find the accumulated errors 
harmless in light of what it considers to be the weight of the other evidence.  (Resp. 
Br., p.34.)  That argument applies the wrong standard, and so, it is contrary to Idaho 
Supreme Court and Untied States Supreme Court precedent, as it effectively asks this 
Court to sit as a thirteenth juror and conclude that, absent those errors, the verdict 
would be the same.   
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the Chapman harmless error test is the 
applicable test in the cumulative error context.  See, e.g., State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 
572-73 (2007).  Therefore, as discussed in depth in Section II(D), supra, the State’s 
argument asks this Court to deny Mr. Sepulveda’s right to a jury trial and speculate what 
a verdict absent the error might be absent the error, rather than, as is proper, evaluate 
whether the cumulated errors surely did not contribute to the verdict actually rendered in 
this case.  See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279.  For the same reasons discussed supra, the 
State has failed to carry its burden in that regard, and so, this Court should vacate the 
tainted judgments of conviction in these cases. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Sepulveda respectfully requests this Court vacate his convictions and 
remand these cases for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 25th day of January, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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